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NOTES
TEXAS GULF SULPHUR: EXPANDING CONCEPTS OF CORPORATE
DIscLosuRE UNDER SEC RULE l0b-5
The path of our lives is often detoured by causal factors which
the unsophisticated observer believes to be unrelated. The truth
of this proposition is corroborated by the influence that mining
activities of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company (hereinafter referred
to as TGS) has had upon federal securities law. Few, if any,
could anticipate the ramifications that a hole drilled into Canadian
soil by TGS in October, 1963, would have upon the daily opera-
tions of the securities market in August, 1968. And yet, this
routine mineral exploration, coupled with the reactions of the
company and some of its employees to its results, furnished the sub-
ject matter for the Second Circuit's landmark opinion in Securities
and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Company.3 The
decision is so far-reaching in its possible applications that the final
disposition of the relevant issues could directly affect the operating
procedures of virtually all phases of our nation's vast securities
industry.
Essentially, the reason for the decision's monumental impact
is its unorthodox application of SEC rule l0b-5,2 a broad anti-
fraud regulation, to certain activities of the company and several
of its directors, officers and employees. That the case was litigated
as far as the circuit court accounts for its further significance, for
previous 10b-5 actions have been disposed of primarily on the
pleadings,3 and have usually gone no further than the administra-
tive and district court levels.4  As a result there has been a con-
I S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCE FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,251
(2d Cir. Aug. 13, 1968), rev'g 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
217 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1968). The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission is referred to throughout this note as the SEC or Commission.
3A. BROMBERG, SEcURITIs LA W: FRAuD-SEC RULE 10-b5 §1.3(2),
at 10 (1968) [hereinafter cited as BRoomi] : "[T]he typical 10b-5 'victory'
is only a holding that a cause of action has been stated, good enough to
withstand a motion to dismiss." Professor Loss wrote in 1961 that no
injunctive or other civil proceedings commenced by the SEC had resulted
in a judicial opinion, and that judicial expression to that time had been
limited to private civil actions and amicus curiae briefs submitted by the
Commission in connection therewith. 3 L. Loss, SEcURITIEs REGULATION
1450-51 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
4It is only recently that circuit courts have begun to speak out on rule
10b-5, and the United States Supreme Court has yet to do so. See BROMBERG
§ 1.3(2), at 10.
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spicuous absence of judicial gloss concerning lOb-5 and vital ques-
tions as to its applicability to corporate management have been
raised but left unanswered. 5 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
has attempted to fill this void in reaching the merits of the alleged
lOb-5 violations, and in doing so has promulgated standards and
tests which will undoubtedly govern future lOb-5 proceedings until
the United States Supreme Court holds otherwise. 6 The opinion
will thereby provide temporary guidelines for the disclosure pro-
cedures of corporations, corporate insiders, stockbrokers, securities
analysts and institutional investors.
However, the facts of the Texas Gulf Sulphur case are at once
so extraordinary, and the disclosure rules laid down by the
majority so broadly phrased, that the decision may very well have
created more problems than it has purportedly solved. This note
will attempt to identify some problems relating to the extent of the
reach of lOb-5 and the tests concerning materiality, with a subse-
quent publication analyzing the press release requirements, and the
impact of the case upon stock option programs, and further indicat-
ing the probable course of lOb-5 enforcement actions in the
immediate future.
THE STATUTORY FRAmBWORK
While the victims of self-dealing and manipulation perpetrated
by corporate insiders were, to a certain extent, afforded a remedy
at common law, the limited duty of disclosure imposed upon insid-
ers dealing in securities with the investing public resulted in patent
injustices.7  For a vivid illustration, one need only examine the
5 See generally Note, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.: The Inside and
Outside of Ride lob-5, 46 B.U.L. REv. 205 (1966).
6 The Texas Gulf Sulphur Company has indicated that review by the
Supreme Court will be sought in due course. See CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
77,589 (Aug. 15, 1968). The Second Circuit has since denied a motion
for rehearing. Thus, in light of the urgent need for clear guidelines with
respect to the application of l0b-5, the Court might well grant a petition
for certiorari if one is sought
7 See generally 3 Loss at 1446-48. Under the majority rule at common
law, officers and directors owed a fiduciary obligation to their corporation
and its stockholders in their dealings with or on behalf of the company but
could otherwise trade freely as individuals in the securities issued by the
corporation as long as they did not make any misrepresentations or state-
ments of half-truth nor actively conceal material facts by word or deed.
Only a minority of jurisdictions imposed affirmative obligations of full dis-
closure upon insiders who traded in the securities of their own corporation,
but a third view, the "special facts" doctrine, espoused by the United States
Supreme Court in Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909), did bring
some measure of control to the situation and was subsequently reflected in
the language of clause 2 of rule lob-5 itself.
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NOTES
well-known case of Goodwin v. Agassiz,8 which demonstrated how
corporate officials who were privy to material inside information
could easily take advantage of ignorant minority stockholders with-
out fear of retribution, especially if the transactions involved took
the form of impersonal and indirect dealings effectuated over a
national exchange. To remedy this defect in the common law, rule
lOb-5 was promulgated as an expansive anti-fraud regulation under
the authority of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.1 The language of the rule is deceptively vague in its details,
and thus remarkably broad in its scope:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails, or of any facility of a national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.10
The rule's failure to specifically delineate those persons and
transactions which fall within its purview accounts for its being
styled the broadest anti-fraud provision under the Securities Ex-
change Act.1" Its apparent vagueness has been viewed by some to
8 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). It must be noted that the basic
facts of Goodwin are remarkably similar to those of the Texas Gulf Sulphur
case, and the two decisions thus serve as a striking contrast between the
disclosure duties which existed at common law and those which are in effect
today.948 Stat. 891, as amenwed, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1964). The statute
presently reads in pertinent part as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . .(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
" See BROMaBEPG § 2.3, at 25; Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5:
Judicial Revisim; of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 627, 687 (1963).
For a thorough discussion of other provisions of the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which were aimed at protecting
1969 ]
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be of constitutional dimension 1 because it fails to provide the
necessary recognizable standards required by the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. However, such "shop worn" contentions
have been incontrovertibly refuted by both scholars in their analysis
of the problem, 13 and by judges in their construction of the rule.1 4
investors from the abuses of fraud see 1 Loss at 129-351. Professor Brom-
berg indicates that due to the great breadth of lOb-5 there has been an
absorption into it of many of the general and special anti-fraud provisions
of the 1934 Act, analogous to that of the first ten amendments into the
fourteenth. BROMBERG §2.5(1), at 41.
Rule lob-5 is substantially broader than § 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 48
Stat. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1964), which proscribes
the recovery of "short swing" profits by corporate directors, officers and
controlling shareholders. Under § 16(b) no fraud nor materiality need be
proven, but profits must be derived by buying and selling (or selling and
buying) within a six month period. The language of lOb-5, on the other
hand, is not restricted to these three groupings of insiders, and does not
limit violations to closed end transactions. The technicalities of § 16(b) are
dealt with extensively in 2 Loss at 1037-1132.
For an analysis of federal activity prior to 1933, which was substan-
tially limited to frauds coming within the Mail Fraud Statute, see 3 Loss
at 1421-30.12 See, e.g., Brief for Appellants Crawford & Clayton at 11-13, S.E.C. v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1192,251 (2d Cir. Aug.
13, 1968); Ruder, Corporate Disclosures Required by the Federal Securities
Laws: The Codification Implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 61 Nw. U.L.
REv. 872 (1967).
13 "Once a basic legislative policy on fraud is set, details can ably be
developed by the courts on a case-by-case basis." Fleischer, "Federal Cor-
poration Law": An Assessment, 78 HAgv. L. REv. 1146, 1179 (1965).
See also Brudney, Insider Securities Dealings During Corporate Crises,
61 MicBr L. Rv. 1, 38 (1965), and Kaplan, Conflict of Interests . . .
Corporate Directors, 50 ILL. B.J. 1072, 1088 (1962).
14 See, e.g., Charles Hughes & Co., Inc. v. S.E.C., 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.
1943), cert. deied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944); Coplin v. United States, 88 F.2d
652 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 703 (1937); Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951). In Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 808, 831-32, reaff'd on later motions, 100 F. Supp. 461 (D.Del.
1951), 103 F. Supp. 47 (D. Del. 1952), Chief Judge Leahy asserted that
the general acceptance and widespread enforcement over an extended period
of § 17 of the Securities Act (whose language was practically identical to
that of 10b-5) and of rule 15cl-2 lent "strong support to the conclusion
that [10b-5's] meaning is sufficiently certain to be comprehended by a
'reasonable and well-intentioned citizen."' Id. at 832. And even substantial
-use of lob-5 over a long period without constitutional question indicated
that such a conclusion was' proper.
An additional construction feature of the rule should be noted in that
-while the rule is divided into three apparently distinct clauses, these have
been generally regarded as mutually supportive rather than mutually e.x-
elusive. At present, the particular clause violated is: of purely academic
interest, for the Commission has tended to lump all three subdivisions to-
gether, and cases construing lob-5 have made little effort to distinguish
between them. BROMBERG §§2.6(1), 2.6(2), at 49-51. Professor Bromberg
notes" that one clause can easily take over the function of another, since
clauses one and three are substantially similar in effect, except that the
[ VOL. 43
Nonetheless, the broadness of the rule's scope has enabled it
to go beyond its simple original purpose of remedying the plight
of the defrauded seller ' 5 to become a ubiquitous element in fed-
eral securities litigation.1 6 The rule's unprecedented development
can only be understood in light of the fact that Congress, in enact-
ing the Securities Exchange Act, wished to insure a broad rather
than restrictive application of the securities laws.' 7  In furtherance
of this objective rule lOb-5 was promulgated as a broad remedial
provision aimed at a variety of activities, whether or not sufficient
to sustain an action for fraud and deceit at common law.- As
the SEC noted in its opinion in Cady, Roberts & Co.,:9 the pre-
curser of the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation:
These anti-fraud provisions [§ 10(b), rule 10b-5, and § 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933] are not intended as a specification of
particular acts or practices which constitute fraud, but rather are
designed to encompass the infinite variety of devices by which undue
advantage may be taken of investors and others. 20
third may possibly be more comprehensive. Thus, the first clause may in
fact be superfluous, and, similarly, the "material untruth" portion of clause
two may serve no independent function, for it appears to be swept up in
the broad fraud language of clauses one and three. Bromberg thus em-
phasizes the primacy of clause three, noting that in order for the second
part of clause two to operate there must be at least something disclosed,
while total silence may violate clauses one or three.
'5 It is established that lOb-5 was a deliberate effort to fill a gap in
the anti-fraud rules then in effect, which reached fraud practiced by sellers
but not by purchasers:
The previously existing rules against fraud . . . applied only to brokers
and dealers. The new rule closes a loophole in the protections against
fraud . . . by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying secur-
ities if they engage in fraud in their purchase. ...
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
10 See Address by Carlos Israels, Practicing Law Institute, Texas Gulf
Sulphur Seminar, Oct. 10, 1968; BROMBERG §2.5(6), at 45.
17 See generally Fleischer, "Federal Corporate Laf': An Assessment,
78 HAiv. L. REv. 1146, 1174-75 (1965).
's Nondisclosure cases were rarely actionable at common law, and to
establish a good common-law cause of action for fraud and deceit, strict
rules with regard to scienter, justifiable reliance, causation and privity had
to be complied wvith. It was the intention of the framers that 10b-5 would
not be limited to the same exacting burdens: of proof that existed at com-
mon law, and that many of these elements would be dispensed with, to
varying degrees, in a 10b-5 action. See BROsmG § 2.7(1), at 55 & n.150.
For an analysis of common-law remedies for fraud and deceit available
prior to the securities acts of 1933 and 1934, see W. Paossm, ToRTs §§ 100-05
(3d ed. 1964), and 3 Loss at 1430-44.
'940 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
20Id. at 911 (footnote omitted). The Cady, Roberts opinion further in-
dicates that lob-5 protection extends to the defrauded buyer even though
its primary function is: to remedy the plight of the defrauded seller. In
other words, common-law distinctions, e.g., that a corporate insider has a
NOTES1969 ]
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Thus, Congress' decision to legislate in the area of exchange
transactions was prompted by a need to protect the general invest-
ing public from inequities that could be suffered by trading on a
comparatively unregulated market. 21  Section 10(b) is an acknowl-
eged catch-all provision 22 intended to prevent the use of manipulative
devices which would interfere with this stated purpose. Conse-
quently, rule lOb-5 was conceived as a means of further enhancing
the position of the individual investor on the open market by
insuring that he would have access to fair and reliable information
about the securities with which he dealt. Perhaps the true purpose
of the rule has been best crystallized by Chief Judge Leahy in his
oft-quoted "equalization of bargaining position" rationale:
The rule is clear. It is unlawful for an insider . . . to purchase ...
stock . . . without disclosing material facts affecting the value of
the stock known . . . by virtue of his inside position but not known
to the . . . [seller], which information would have affected the
judgment of the sellers. The duty of disclosure stems from the
necessity of preventing a corporate insider from utilizing his position
to take unfair advantage of the uninformed . . . [outsider]. It is
an attempt to provide some degree of equalization of bargaining
position in that . . . [outsiders] may exercise an informed judgment
in any such transaction. 23
Thus, while disclosure of information may not have been one
of its original objectives, lOb-5 has gradually evolved into a dis-
closure rule via its equalization function. However, it must be
noted that disclosure is not the only means of satisfying the rule.
In situations where the insider chooses not to disclose material
information, he is expected, under lOb-5, to refrain from trading
altogether, and in this way the fraudulent act will be curtailed.2 4
fiduciary obligation to existing stockholders but not to the public to whom
he sells, are clearly inappropriate under the broad remedial provisions of
the securities acts. Id. at 913-14.
21See H.R REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).22See, e.g., 3 Loss at 1424 & n.7; BaomaBRG § 2.2, at 19.23Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (emphasis
added), reaff'd on later motions, 100 F. Supp. 461, 463 (D. Del. 1951),
103 F. Supp. 47 (D. Del. 1952). Although Chief Judge Leahy spoke
strictly in terms of insiders, his ideas have been accepted in a wider sense.
See BROmBERG § 3.2, at 64 & n.5. The duties of disclosure thus imposed on
trading insiders by 10b-5 have also been justified on the basis of general
equitable principles. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp.
512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
24See generally BRommG § 12.3, at 269-71. It is thus evident "that
lOb-5's disclosure thrust is a combination of activity deterrent and trading
prohibition when . . . disclosure is not feasible." Id. at 270. Disclosure is
"not feasible" when the corporation, for business reasons, has decided that
disclosure would not be proper. In this situation, the insider has no alterna-
tive. He may not disclose (because of his: fiduciary responsibilities) and
therefore he must not trade.
[ VOL. 43
During the early years of securities law it was not readily
apparent whether a private civil action would be afforded the
aggrieved investor. The query was resolved by Kardon v. National
Gypsum C&.,25 which recognized an implied civil liability under
rule lob-5 that is now a widely accepted and oft-utilized federal
remedy. 26  The long delay in the recognition of such a remedy
stemmed from the absence of any reference to a private right of
action within the language of section 10(b), whereas other pro-
visions of both the Securities Act of 1933 27 and the 1934 Act
expressly provided for private remedies.28 Nevertheless, the Kardon
court held that although neither section 10(b) nor rule lOb-5
expressly allowed court suits by parties injured as a result of
violations, for a manipulating investor to disregard the statutory
mandate would be tantamount to a tort. Notwithstanding the
statutory distinctions, it was believed that in view of the general
purpose of the 1934 Act, to regulate securities transactions of all
kinds, the mere omission of an express provision for a civil remedy
would be insufficient to deny a liability which, in accordance with
general principles of tort law, normally would accompany the
commission of the prohibited act.2 9 The Second Circuit's decision
in Texas Gulf Sulphur takes on added significance as the first
cogent attempt by an appellate tribunal to provide the necessary
standards for the implementation of rule lOb-5. The court has
apparently attempted to frame rules of universal applicability con-
cerning insider trading and corporate disclosure procedures as a
25 69 F. Supp. 512 (ED. Pa. 1946).2GFor a circuit-by-circuit breakdown of the courts which have explicitly
approved and adopted the Kardon doctrine, see Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 676 (N.D. Ind. 1966). For the
advantages to the private plaintiff of an implied civil remedy under 10b-5
in comparison with other remedies expressly available under other pro-
visions of the 1934 Act, with respect to statutes of limitation, security for
expenses, private requirements, standards of proof, etc., see BROMBERG § 2.5,
at 41-47.
2748 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1964).
28There are three specific provisions imposing civil relief for fraud
violations under the 1933 Act: § 11, 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15
U.S.C. §77k (1964); § 12(1), 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amwded, 15 U.S.C.§771(1) (1964); §12(2), 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.§ 771(2) (1964); and buyers and sellers are provided with causes of action
for two types of unfair conduct under the 1934 Act: § 9(3), 48 Stat. 890(1934), as anended, 15 U.S.C. §78i(3) (1964) ; § 18(a), 48 Stat. 897 (1934),
as anended, 15 U.S.C. §78r(a) (1964). For possible shortcomings of these
provisions see Note, supra note 5, at 209 & n.19.
28 69 F. Supp. at 514. For the subsequent development of private dam-
age actions under rule 10b-5 see Annot., 37 A.L.R. 2d 649 (1954); Ruder,
supra note 11, at 687-90; BROMBERG § 2.4(1), at 27-34, and 3 Loss at 1763
& nn.260-61. Note that while 10b-5 was created for the benefit of defrauded
sellers, now this implied right extends to buyers also. See BROMBERG § 2.4(2),
at 34-39.
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means of ensuring in the future a more consistent and effectual
application of the rule. However, the broad sweep attributed by
the court to a lOb-5 fraud evidences an intention not only to
crystallize existing views as to the scope of the rule, but to extend
its reach to heretofore unregulated and unquestioned activities. In
doing so, the court may very well have imposed upon corporate
insiders insurmountable burdens of compliance. Thus, in analyzing
what the court has said about insider trading and materiality, the
practical implications of the court's conclusions concerning the
business and financial community must be carefully considered.
TEXAS GULF SULPHUR AS AN INSIDERS CASE
The Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation was precipitated by the
discovery of a substantial ore strike near Timmins, Ontario, some-
time between November 12, 1963 and April 16, 1964. The find-
ings of the district court 30 indicated that initial aerial surveys in
March of 1959 first convinced a TGS exploration group that the
area might contain potentially rich mineral deposits. Preliminary
ground surveys in October of 1963 confirmed the presence of
extraordinary variations in the conductivity of the rocks suggest-
ing that drilling of a diamond core for further evaluation would be
in order. Drilling of the initial hole (K-55-1) was commenced on
November 8th and completed on the 12th, at which time visual
estimates of the core apprised TGS of the desirability of acquiring
the remainder of the Kidd-55 land tract. To facilitate this land
acquisition program, the core was concealed and President Stephens
of TGS told those who knew of the preliminary results not to
disclose them to anyone.31 Furthermore, a subsequent chemical
assay of the K-55-1 core proved so remarkable that neither defend-
ant Clayton, an experienced geophysicist, nor four other TGS
expert witnesses "had ever seen or heard of a comparable initial
exploratory drill hole in a base metal deposit." 32
Between November 12, 1963, and March 31, 1964, the date
on which drilling was resumed, a number of TGS insiders and
several other persons who had allegedly received "tips" from
30 S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 269-75 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
"See S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH Fmn. SEc. L. REP. ff 92,
251, at 97,174 (2d Cir., Aug. 13, 1968). Not even other officers, directors
or employees of TGS were to be told of the information, and the hole was
not only concealed, but "a barren core was: intentionally drilled off the
anomaly." Id.
s2Id. It was at this point that the trial court had concluded that there
was "no doubt that the drill core of K-55-1 was unusually good and that
it excited the interest and speculation of those who knew about it." See
258 F. Supp. at 282.
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them 33 purchased substantial amounts of TGS stock. During this
same period TGS issued stock options to five officers and em-
ployees, who were either familiar with the detailed results of
K-55-1 or had at least learned that a hole revealing valuable bodies
of ore had been drilled, though none of this information had been
disseminated to the company's Stock Option Committee or its
Board of Directors. Drilling operations continued at a rapid pace
so that by April 8th, according to the trial court, there was real
evidence that a "body of commercially mineable ore" might exist,3 4
and by the 10th, substantial copper mineralization had been en-
countered. By this time unauthorized rumors of a major ore strike
had begun to circulate about Canada and had even found their way
into several New York newspapers. The company's reaction was
to draft and issue a press release intended to quell the rumors, but
purporting to give the latest Timmins drilling results up to the
time of its release on April 12. The initial drilling program pro-
ceeded to completion the morning of April 16, 1964, when the
company issued an official detailed statement which announced a
strike of at least twenty-five million tons of ore and which was
immediately read to representatives of the American financial
media. '5
Suit was instituted by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion in 1966 against the company and those officers who knew of
the Timmins discovery and had either traded, tipped or accepted
stock options on the basis of that information before it had been
disseminated to the general investing public on April 16, on the
33 The alleged tipping took one of two forms: either the defendant in-
sider had divulged information to an outsider for use in purchasing TGS
stock or calls, or he had recommended purchase of the stock while the
information remained undisclosed to the general investing public and to the
particular tippees. Note also that certain defendants only purchased TGS
stock while others only "tipped" material information and some did both.
34 258 F. Supp. at 281-82.
35 Additionally, an article appearing in the April 16th issue of a Canadian
industrial journal, The Northern Miner, which had initially been read by
a TGS mining engineer and returned unamended on the 15th, confirmed
a ten million ton strike. Similarly, a statement concerning the extent of
the discovery, which had been substantially drafted by that same engineer,
was released to the Canadian media early on the morning of the 16th.
See S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 92,251,
at 97,176 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 1968).
Note that only three of the defendants involved in the Texas Gulf
Sulphur appeal engaged in market activity between the time of the first
release on April 12, and the official dissemination on April 16: Clayton,
a geophysicist and electrical engineer for TGS, who ordered 200 shares
on the 15th, Crawford, secretary of the company, who ordered 300 shares
on the 15th and another 300 on the 16th prior to the company's announce-
ment, and TGS director Coates who left the press conference of the 16th to
call his son-in-law (a broker) and order 2000 shares for family trust
accounts.
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ground that these activities constituted violations of both section
10(b) and rule lOb-5. In a lengthy opinion by Judge Bonsai,
the District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed
the SEC complaint against all but two of the individual defendants.
In reversing Judge Bonsal's order of dismissal as to all but a
few of the original defendants in the action, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit did not formulate any revolutionary theories
with respect to the definition of an insider under 10b-5. However,
Judge Waterman did seek to clarify previous misconceptions as
to exactly who was capable of committing a violation under the
rule.
It must be understood that while the language of 10b-5 is not
expressly limited to insiders and extends to any person engaging
in fraudulent practices in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities, it has long been recognized that the rule does in fact
apply to insiders and, in practice, it has been utilized most often
and most successfully in this regard. Actually, corporate insiders
have been hardest hit (with the possible exception of broker-deal-
ers) by the application of 01b-5 because it is they who are most
likely to come into contact with the value-relevant information not
ordinarily available to the average investor.3 However, until the
SEC handed down its opinion in Cady, Roberts & Co.,3 7 it ap-
peared that the application of the rule would be substantially re-
stricted to the three classes of persons defined as insiders under
16(b)-directors, officers and 10% stockholders-and to members
of their immediate families.- The Commission sought to clarify
any doubts as to what persons were actually subject to the pro-
scriptions of rule lOb-5 by formulating in the Cady, Roberts opinion
an "access test" which indicated that, for 10b-5 purposes, tradi-
tional fiduciary elements would be dispensed with in favor of
promoting general concepts of fairness with respect to securities
transactions. The Commission specifically pointed out that while
officers, directors and controlling stockholders had traditionally
been held liable under lb-5, they were not the only people who
were capable of violating the rule; rather, for one to fall within
the ambit of lOb-5's "any person," only two qualitative elements
had to be satisfied:
First, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or in-
directly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate
36See BROMBERG § 12.4, at 273; 3 Loss at 1445, 1473-74. See also Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
3740 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
38 See 3 Loss at 1450-56, 1450 n.18; Note, supra note 5, at 211-20.
While the amount of case law concerning members of the immediate family
was concedediy small, the trend indicated that the duty to disclose would
extend at least to an insider's wife.
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purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing.39
The Commission expressly intended that, in considering these
elements, fine distinctions and rigid classifications would be avoided
in determining the obligations of "insiders" under lOb-5:
Thus, our task here is to identify those persons who are in a special
relationship with a company and privy to its internal affairs, and
thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in its securities. Intimacy
demands restraint lest the uninformed be exploited. 40
In holding liable various lower echelon employees of the
corporation (e.g., field geologist, officer manager), even though
their actual connection with the company may have been somewhat
remote, the circuit court in Texas Gulf Sulphur has provided the
SEC with the first substantial judicial confirmation of the Cady,
Roberts formulation, at least as it pertained to the classification
of intra-corporate personnel as insiders. The Texas Gulf Sulphur
opinion specifically relied on the "access test" in emphasizing that
rule l0b-5 would be applicable to anyone in possession of material
inside corporate information.41 One who found himself in such
a situation would have two courses of action open to him: he
could either disclose such information to the investing public, or,
if he could not do so because it would violate a corporate con-
fidence, or merely chose not to disclose for other reasons, he
would have to refrain from trading in the securities of the company
and from recommending them to other persons while the informa-
tion remained undisclosed. Thus, with specific reference to the
Texas Gulf Sulphur situation, though the land acquisition program
may have constituted a legitimate corporate reason for non-dis-
closure of the developments on the Timmins segment, it certainly
could not justify trading on the part of TGS insiders if such in-
formation was deemed to be material under the tests laid down
by the court.
While the Second Circuit may in its express affirmance of
the Cady access test have provided a uniform standard by which
the identity of insiders subject to rule lOb-5 may be determined,
many problems relating to the application of this test still remain.
39 40 S.E.C. at 912 (1961) (footnote omitted). It would seem that
the critical element here would be access rather than unfairness, for the
latter is necessarily implicit in the materiality of the information.40 d. (emphasis added).
41S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,251, at
97,178 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 1968).
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Apparently the court believes that insiders cannot be placed in
finely defined categories, but rather that the touchstone must be
a fundamental one of information-yielding relationships; for the
access test is phrased in general terms and the Texas Gudf Sulphur
decision has failed, possibly intentionally, to supply the specific
types of special relationships that will satisfy the test. For
example, will all lower echelon employees who come into possession
of inside information, irrespective of the scope of their functions
within the corporate structure, become burdened with heretofore
uncontemplated duties of disclosure? Just how involved in the
internal affairs of the company must one be before his obligation
to disclose arises? And perhaps the most relevant consideration
is whether or not those remote outsiders who receive information
from knowledgable insiders will be subject to comparable disclosure
requirements.4
In searching for answers to these questions, it appears, at
the very least, that all lower echelon employees will be subject to
the limitations of lOb-5 if they become privy to material inside
information under circumstances that satisfy the Cady access test.
The broad language of the court with respect to "anyone in pos-
session of material inside information" indicates that in imposing
the burden of disclosure upon corporate employees no distinctions
should be drawn between positions of varying responsibility;
rather, under Texas Gultf Sulphur, any employee in possession of
the requisite information would fall within the rubric of "insider."
The fact that the Commission relied in part on a holding in an
analogous area, citing the case of Brophy v. Cities Service Co.,43
to justify their refusal to coin the Cady access test in terms of
rigid classifications, would seem to compel such a conclusion. For
in the Brophy holding, in defining the fiduciary obligations of
employees with respect to material, undisclosed information, the
court pointed out that while a mere employee does not normally
occupy a position of trust and confidence toward his employer, if
that same employee acquired secret information relating to the
42 Two important considerations must be kept in mind here. First, all
of the individual defendants in the Texas Gulf Sulphur proceeding, though
some were technically "lower echelon employees," possessed positions of
some responsibility in the corporation. In other words, the standards
adopted by the court cannot be viewed as binding upon all types of cor-
porate employees, and there may be a point at levels lower than those
occupied by the specific defendants in the action at which the duty to dis-
close may no longer attach. Second, the SEC did not bring charges
against any of the tippees of the insider defendants, and thus different rules
of disclosure may apply to these individuals also.
4331 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949).
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employer's business, he would then occupy such a position and
would have to govern his actions accordingly.44
Furthermore, since the essence of the test is the existence of
a relationship to the corporation which gives an individual access
to information usable only for corporate purposes, it is quite
possible that business associates of insiders would very easily
become insiders themselves under the Cady approach.45 Among
the most probable outsiders to become insiders in this manner
would be: (1) professional advisors (such as lawyers, accountants,
engineers and public relations consultants) ; (2) outside firms
with representatives serving as directors or officers of an issuer
or which receive vital corporate information in the ordinary course
of its business activities (e.g., institutional investors," investment
banking firms, proposed merger partners); and (3) government
officials serving in capacities through which they necessarily obtain
information relevant to a company's securities.47  This rather un-
limited approach to the "insider" concept adopted by the Texas
Gulf Sulphur court may pose serious problems for the business
community since corporations rely to a great extent on outside
advice and consultation. It would seem that outside firms which
ordinarily supply corporations with representatives in possession
of special skills to serve as directors or permanent advisors would
now be more reluctant to do so. In fact, brokerage houses have
already announced their decisions to sever all such ties with client
corporations. 4s
4-1Id. at 7. In Brophy, the court held that a lower echelon employee who
in the course of his duties had acquired information concerning future plans
of the corporation with regard to the purchase of its own securities could
not use the information for his own personal gain and would be accountable
for any profit derived on a constructive trust theory.
45See, e.g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Mutual
Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1967). In dealing
with outsiders who become insiders, a crucial problem involves ascertaining
the exact point at which the "transformation" is effectuated; for if the
trading occurred prior to this moment no violation could occur.
46 Note that the problem of institutional investors and their accessibility
to inside corporate information has recently become so evident that a SEC
study has been proposed to examine the feasibility of specific regulation
and legislative action beyond what is already provided under lob-5.
47See BRoamG § 7.4(6) (b), at 180. Professor Bromberg has also
formulated a fundamental checklist of potential insiders under the Cady and
Texas Gulf Sulphur doctrines which includes: a) directors, officers, major
security holders; b) lower echelon employees; c) outside professional ad-
visors (including management counselors, financial advisors, and testing
labs) - d) business connections (e.g., lenders, underwriters, customers, sup-
pliers) ; e) analysts and institutional investors; f) their firms, associates and
families; g) their brokers; h) their tippees. Speech by Prof. Bromberg,
Practising Law Institute Texas Gulf Silphur Seminar, Oct. 10, 1968.
48 N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1968, § 3, at 1, col. 3.
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Yet, the most critical problem raised by the Texas Gulf
Sulphur definition of insider relates to its influence on tipping of
vital corporate information. The prevalence of "tips" in the open
market has long been a recognized phenomenon; supposedly con-
fidential corporate information escapes in a variety of ways, and
not the least of these involves personal contacts with corporate
management or other individuals in privity with management.
49
The Second Circuit has explicitly held that an insider who tips
material information to a non-insider before the information has
been disclosed publicly violates rule lOb-5, and it would appear
that the mere recommendation to purchase the stock in question
by an insider in possession of the undisclosed information is also
proscribed by the rule.50 Of course, trading on the part of the
tippee lies at the crux of the tipping violation, since otherwise the
rule's "in connection with the purchase or sale of a security" re-
quirement would not be satisfied. The court, in labeling tipping
as a lOb-5 violation, strongly suggested that when any commumi-
cation relating to the purchase of stock is made, and the tippee
subsequently engages in substantial transactions in the security
involved, such transactions constitute strong circumstantial evidence
that vital corporate information was disclosed.51 However, it has
been suggested, though the Second Circuit did not specifically refer
to this problem, that tipping should not constitute a violation if
relayed for a legitimate corporate purpose to an underwriter, at-
torney or public relations counsel, under circumstances in which
the insider would not reasonably believe that his tippee would use
49See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, April 27, 1965, at 1, col. 6; Wall
Street Journal, February 14, 1965, at 14, col. 4. A large brokerage house
often secures advance news releases from companies in order to prepare
them for dissemination to branch offices; yet, there is nothing to prevent
registered representatives from seeing these advances and taking advantage
of the information they contain. Weisen, Disclosure of Inider Informatiou,
-Materiality and Texa= Gulf Sulphur, 28 MD. L. REv. 189, 191-94 (1968).
50 S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CC-2 FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,251,
at 97,181 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 1968).51 Defendant Darke, while in possession of detailed knowledge of the
K-55-1 drilling results, had merely told certain outsiders that TGS "was a
good buy." The trial court found that the substantial amounts of stock and
calls purchased by these tippees on March 30, 1964, was strong circum-
stantial evidence that he had passed word on to one or more of them that
drilling was about to be resumed. The appeals court thus concluded that
"[o]bviously if such a resumption were to have any meaning to such
'tippees,' they must have previously been told of K-55-1." CCH FED. Sun. L.
REP. ff 92,251, at 97,181. But note that two of the circuit court judges
favored a remand for the determination of the issue of whether Darke
expressly or impliedly transmitted to his tippees any information concerning
the drilling results in as much as that issue had not been definitively re-
solved below (because the information was not yet deemed material by the
trial court). Id. at n.16.
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the information for his own benefit or subsequently tip it to
others.5
2
In as much as no tippees were defendants in the action, the
Texas Gulf court did not decide whether they too would violate
lb-5 by trading with actual or constructive knowledge that the
material information communicated to them had not been similarly
disseminated among the general investing public. However, in
noting that, when compared to the conduct of their insider source,
trading on he part of tippees could be "equally reprehensible,"
the court strongly implied that such action would constitute a
lOb-5 violation.5 3
While the fraud results from trading on the basis of undis-
closed, material information, whether the trader is tipper or tippee,
courts have in the past been more reluctant to apply the fraud
provisions of the securities acts to alleged violations by the tippee,
because when he trades under such circumstances, neither party
to the transactiin is, at the same time, a recognized fiduciary of
the corporation and a person who directly benefits from the abuse.
Furthermore, a l0b-5 violation on the part of a tippee is much
more difficult to prove than a lOb-5 violation on the part of the
insider himself; it is much easier to detect an untimely transaction
by an acknowledged insider than to show that he has privately
divulged confidential information to a third person who is unknown
to the SEC as far as section 16(a) reporting requirements are
concerned. Because of the problems with respect to detection,
tippee fraud has rarely been proven, and this is probably the
reason for the lack of decisive law in the area.5 4
However, it appears that we are now moving towards a wide-
spread recognition of the fact that even remote tippees are capable
of violating rule lOb-5; in light of certain statements made in
recent lower court decisions, the Texas Gulf Sulphur dictum with
respect to tippees may appear to be more a crystallization of cur-
rent thinking in the area than the formulation of a revolutionary
52 Speech, supra note 47. Query: should a duty not to tip also be im-
posed upon remote tippees? If so, should a distinction be made between
those who receive the information in conjunction with a formal corporate
program and those who do not? One authority believes that while a tippee
can become a tipper by again passing on information to a third party who
takes advantage of it, the primary concern should focus upon the first
communicative link-that from corporate manager to his tippee. Weisen,
supra note 49, at 198.53 S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH Fmn. SEc. L. REP. f 92,251
at 97,181 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 1968).54 Weisen, supra note 49, at 198-99. With respect to stemming the flow
of inside information, Weisen places little emphasis on tippee liability and
feels that the key to control must involve regulation of corporate managers
as tippers.
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new doctrine. For example, in the recent case of Ross, v. Licht,55
the district court, attempting to ascertain the liability of three
-acknowledged non-insiders allegedly involved in a 10b-5 type fraud,
stated that "[i]f Sidney, Grapel and Bluestone were not insiders,
they would seem to have been 'tippees' (persons given information
by insiders in breach of trust) and subject to the same duty as
insiders." 66 Moreover, a Texas district court has explicitly pro-
claimed that "a tippee stands in the same position as a corporate
insider relative to the provisions of the Act and Rule 10b-5. The
tippee... must be painted with the same brush and the same color
as the insider from whom the tippee receives his information." 57
To be liable under the rule the tippee would not have to act in
concert with the tipper; rather, he would be subject to the same
duties and disabilities as an insider as long as he obtained access
to undisclosed information through the insider.
This Texas case involved a rather unique cause of action which
raised another important issue with respect to the tipper-tippee
problem: can a tippee maintain a fraud action, against an insider
for transmission of false and misleading information? The plain-
tiff alleged that in purchasing stock he relied on confidential in-
formation given him by the then president of the issuing company,
and the information proved false, forcing him to sell at a loss.
The court, in dismissing the action, ruled as a matter of law that
lob-5 was not intended to sustain such a fraud action by a tippee;
the persons to be protected were the ordinary investors acting upon
generally available information and not those who possessed (or
believed they possessed) access to secret, material, confidential
corporate information. Irrespective of the congressional intent
behind 10b-5, the court held alternately that the doctrine of pari
delicto would constitute a valid defense to any such suit against
a tipper by his tippee.-8
Certain collateral theories of law have been utilized by various
courts to further justify the inclusion of tippees within the scope
of lOb-5's proscriptions. Professor Loss has urged the adoption
of a constructive trust theory, successfully employed in analogous
situations (e.g., real estate receivership proceedings), 59 but ap-
parently the SEC has not pursued such an approach.60 More
recently, it was suggested that tippees might be held liable under
10b-5 for aiding and abetting a violation of the rule by an acknow-
55263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
56 Id. at 410 (emphasis added).57 Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., CCH FE. SEc. L. REP. 92,282, at 97,347
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 1968).
58 Id.
59 See 3 Loss at 1451.
60 See Note, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sudphur Co.: The Ind"ide and Outside
of Rule 10b-5, 46 B.U.L. REv. 205 (1966).
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ledged insider;"' however, this approach is rather limited in that
it seems to assume some degree of collusion between tipper and
tippee. Conceptually, precedents from a variety of analogous legal
doctrines-e.g., trusts, agency, trade secrets, and bankruptcy re-
organizations--can be used to justify the imposition of liability
upon both tippers and tippees under lOb-5.
6 2
Whatever means of justification is employed, however, it seems
clear that under Texas Gulf Sulphur a duty of disclosure, an-
alogous to that which governs the conduct of a true insider, will
be imposed upon even remote tippees. Generally, the tippee will
commit an unlawful act under lOb-5 whenever he uses material
undisclosed information in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security in as much as such action would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon the other party to the transaction. It would appear,
however, that the tippee must either know or have sufficient reason
to know that the information derives from an inside source.63  The
requisite specificity of the information apparently is implicit in the
determination of the materiality of the information. This brings
us to the realization that none of the disclosure obligations of
insiders and tippers can be fully comprehended without a further
in depth analysis of the concept of materiality. For a reasonable
degree of compliance with these standards can only be attained if
it is possible to ascertain, with confidence and clarity, what is
or is not material information.
G1See, e.g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The
aiding and abetting approach has more often been utilized as a means of
holding true insiders liable under lOb-5 for acts of silence or non-disclosure.
See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D.
Ind. 1966); Petit v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y.
1963).6 2BRomBERG § 7.4(6) (b), at 180-81. Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267
(1951), a reorganization case, has most often been utilized to justify the
inclusion of tipping as a violation of 10b-5. In Mosser, a reorganization
trustee of two common-law trusts, whose principal assets were the securities
of subsidiary companies, employed two assistants whom he expressly allowed
to continue trading in the securities of these companies. The trustee was
surcharged an amount equal to the profits derived by the two employees
on the ground that since he could not lawfully engage in such transactions,
he should not be authorized to permit others to do so. The court felt that
the most effective sanction to insure efficient administration on the
part of the trustee was to hold him personally liable for the consequence
of acts which he had the power to forbid. Id. at 274. The analogy to
lOb-5 seems clear-the best way to curb the flow of inside information is
to stop tipping, and the best way to accomplish that is to hold tippers
liable for its consequence.
10 Professor Bromberg suggests that the standard of reasonableness ap-
plicable is that of a person in similar circumstances, and might differ for
a broker, an institutional investor, geologist, etc. He also implies that
while the violation should depend upon actual or constructive knowledge of
a company source, the satisfaction of such a requirement would be implicit
in the access test. Speech, supra note 47.
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THE TOUCHSTONES OF THE DUTY To DISCLOsE:
MATERIALITY AND PUBLIC DISSEMINATION
The Test of Materiality
The 10b-5 limitation on insider trading turns upon the re-
quirement that while in possesion of material undisclosed corporate
information, the insider either must divulge such information to
the general investing public (at least where he is trading on the
open market, i.e., a national stock exchange) or refrain from trad-
ing in the securities of the particular corporation. The materiality
of information becomes the key consideration in determining the
point at which the duty to disclose or refrain from trading arises.
The Texas Gulf Sulphur court took cognizance of this fact and
formulated a comprehensive, though basic, test of materiality sub-
stantially derived from previous judicial expressions in the area.
The court essentially relied on its own statement in List v. Fashion
Park, Inc. : "[t]he basic test of materiality . . . is whether a
reasonable man would attach importance . . . in determining his
choice of action in the transaction in questiom" 6 This, the court
noted, would encompass any fact "which in reasonable and objective
contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's stock or
securities .... ," 66 Primary emphasis was thus placed upon the
reaction of the "reasonable man" rather than upon that of the
actual investor who would be injured by the actions of the insider.
Though both the district and circuit court opinions relied upon
the reasonable man test, the tests of materiality drafted and applied
by them were markedly different. The sharp distinctions between
the district and circuit court tests becomes especially relevant when
it is realized that different conclusions were reached as to the
liability of most of the individual defendants only because the two
courts sharply disagreed on the exact moment at which the results
of the Timmins discovery actually did become material; because
Judge Bonsal held that the information with regard to the drilling
operations could not be deemed material until 7:00 p.m. on April
"340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
" S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,251,
at 97,178 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 1968), quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965) (emphasis supplied by the Texas Gulf Sulphur
court). Accord, Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
wherein the court interpreted the List case as requiring an examination as
to whether the outside investor would have been deterred from making the
sale if the particular information had been disclosed.
66 S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., C.C.H. FED. SEc. L. REP ft 92,251,
at 97,178 (2d Cir. Aug 13, 1968), quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965), quoting Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d
634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963) (emphasis supplied by the Texas Gulf Sulphur
court). See also Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del.
1951); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
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9, 1964, 67 none of the insider transactions which occurred between
November 12, 1963 and that date could have violated rule lOb-5,
whereas Judge Waterman's determination that the results of the
K-55-1 drill core were in fact material as of November 12, 1963,
would place all these transactions directly within the rule's pro-
scriptions.°a  The district court placed primary emphasis on the
impact the drilling results would have upon the market price of
TGS stock if disclosed. In light of expert testimony to the effect
that the results of one drill hole do not constitute a reliable basis
for predicting the actual outcome of mining operations, and are
possibly of no realistic value whatsoever, and the fact that there
was no real evidence that a body of commercially mineable ore
might exist until the night of April 9, the court concluded that
the drilling results of K-55-1, when considered in relation to the
"far flung business" of TGS at the time, did not constitute material
information. It could not be stated with reasonable certainty that
the disclosure of such findings would have had a substantial impact
upon the market price of TGS's 10,000,000 outstanding shares.6 9
The Second Circuit took a different view of the evidence and
the expert testimony. Though the K-55-1 results may have been
speculative at best, the appellate court majority concluded that
knowledge of the mere possibility (which they deemed "more than
marginal") that a mine of "the vast magnitude indicated by the
remarkably rich drill core located rather close to the surface . . *
within the confines of a large anomaly (suggesting an extensive
region of mineralization) might well have affected the price of
TGS stock and would certainly have been an important fact to a
reasonable, if speculative, investor in deciding whether he should
buy, sell or hold." 70 On this basis, the court held that those
defendants who had purchased TGS stock or calls while apprised
of the preliminary drilling results had violated rule lOb-5 in not
first disclosing such material information to the investing public.71
67258 F. Supp at 282.68 CCH FED. S. L. REP. 1192,251, at 92,181 (2d Cir. Aug 13, 1968).
69258 F. Supp at 282-83.70CCH FED. Sc. L. REP. 192,251, at 97,179 (2d Cir. Aug, 13 1968).
It would seem that the circuit court's reference to the possibility of the
existence of a rich mine as being "more than marginal" is in conflict with
the observation by the trial court that all the experts agreed that a single
drill core did not establish an ore body or a mine and that "[d]efendants'
experts unanimously concluded that there is no way even to estimate the
probabilities that one drill core will lead to the discovery of an ore body."
258 F. Supp at 282. Furthermore, with respect to the circuit court's
reference to the implications of the anomaly on which K-55-1 was located,
it appears to be inconsistent with the trial court's finding that the "con-
ductive materials evidenced by the survey outside the first drill hole could
have consisted of worthless pyrite or graphite, both of which materials were
found in the core of K-55-1." Id.
71Id. at 97,179-80. The court drew no distinction here between those
who knew of the results of the visual evaluation and those with knowledge
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Thus, while both courts apparently' attempted to apply the standards
of reasonableness they arrived at apparently irreconcilable con-
clusions.
The key factor in the appellate court's determination that the
K-55-1 discovery was a material fact turned upon the significance
attached to the drilling results by those defendants who knew
about it. According to the court, the timing of the purchases of
stock and calls by those insiders apprised of the results 72 conclu-
sively indicated that they were influenced by such knowledge,
especially in light of the trial court's failure to identify any factor
other than the extraordinary K-55-1 discovery that could have
accounted for the accelerated insider activity which took place
between November 12, 1963 and April 9, of the following year.
The court further reasoned that outside investors, who were per-
haps more familiar with "speculative modes of investment," would
have been similarly influenced. Thus the information could be
deemed material simply because there was no reason why reason-
able investors "would not have been similarly motivated to invest
if they had known what the insider investors knew about the
K-55-1 discovery." 73 In other words, the drilling results were
certainly facts which in reasonable and objective contemplation
might affect the value of TGS's stock or securities.
The trial court, on the other hand, refused to consider the
insider trading activity as evidence of the materiality of the
Timmins find, for it believed that these purchases had been
motivated by educated guesses on the part of the insiders that the
drilling would lead to the discovery of a mine, and that these
preditions were made possible only because of the insider's con-
siderable expertise in evaluating the K-55-1 results. The court
believed that outside investors could "never match the knowledge
of an insider who necessarily knows more about the company and
is in a better position to evaluate its prospects." 7' The trial court's
rationale was premised upon an assumption that insiders will in-
evitably formulate educated guesses about all programs embarked
upon by their company; consequently, if such guesses are used as
a means of determining the materiality of corporate information,
of the chemical assay, for while the former were somewhat less accurate
than the latter, it still could be considered "a generally reliable estimate."
"
2 Between the completion of K-55-1 on November 12, 1963, and that
of the second drill hole (K-55-3) on April 7, 1964, five of the individual
defendants in the action had purchased in excess of $100,000 worth of
TGS stock and calls thereon. 258 F. Supp. at 283. The circuit court
further pointed out that certain of the insiders who traded during this
period had never before dealt in the securities of the company in this
manner. Id. at 97,180.
73M.
74258 F. Supp. at 284.
[ VoL.. 43
NOTES
it would have the effect of deterring all insider trading "although
insiders should be encouraged to have a stake in the companies for
which they work." 7" This line of reasoning was not adopted by
the circuit court, which, while conceding that insiders should not be
obligated to share their superior financial or other expert skills
with outside investors by revealing educated guesses or predictions,
strongly believed that an individual investor must be given the
opportunity to draw upon his own "evaluative expertise" in making
investment decisions, and that he can only do so when supplied
with the same hard facts which insiders ordinarily have at their
disposal.76
The circuit court also rejected the contention that their test
of materiality should be governed by a consideration of the possi-
bility that insider trading benefits would be eliminated, for such
benefits were viewed as "forms of secret corporate compensation
. . . derived at the expense of the uninformed investing public and
not at the expense of the corporation which receives the sole
benefit from insider incentives." '7 It was felt that adequate incen-
tives for corporate officers could and should alternatively be pro-
vided by "properly administered stock options" and "employee
purchase plans."
It has been suggested elsewhere's that both courts erred in
failing to distinguish between the trading. and tipping violations
when considering the problems associated with insiders' educated
guesses. While it may have been debatable whether Judge Bon-
sal's reasoning could validly be applied to the trading violations,
there was no doubt that they were totally inapplicable to insider
tipping because krith respect to the latter there are no policy con-
siderations to, be balanced against the unfairness involved in as
much as no interests of corporate management in the company are
at stake.7"
There appear to be some serious problems inherent in the
circuit court's subjective approach to materiality. First of all,
there is the grave possibility that in making a determination of
materiality the court was improperly guided by hindsight, for they
7Id. The trial court feared that insiders would find themselves in
the following dilemma: If they disclosed educated guesses which sub-
sequently proved wrong, the insiders would be subject to suit; yet if
they concealed them, proceeded to purchase stock, and the guesses later
turned out to be correct, they would again be subject to suit.
70CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1192,251, at 27,178 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 1968).
77 Id. at 97,180.
78 See Weisen, Disclosure of Inside Inforrnation-Materiality and
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 28 MD. L. REv. 187, 209 (1968).
70 The author thus concluded that "[e]ducated guesses are valuable in-
formation which probably cannot be disseminated to the public, perhaps
should not be traded upon, and definitely should not be disclosed to a few
persons." Id.
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had at their disposal knowledge of the completed Timmins oper-
ation which could not have possibly been available to the defend-
ants at the time they made their transactional decisions. Yet,
a court must necessarily limit its consideration to those facts
available at the time of the transactions and must refrain from
determining the materiality of the information in light of the facts
as they may subsequently appear; this is a difficult task at best,
and there is some doubt as to whether the circuit court faithfully
abided by it.80 Furthermore, the materiality of the information is
a question which must turn upon the facts as they are determined
by the fact-finder, whether it be the court or the jury,s1 and Judge
Moore, in dissent, has severely criticized the court's subjective
approach as a usurpation of the jury's fact-finding responsibilities.
He alleged that the majority fully disregarded the findings of the
trial court and improperly substituted themselves as the jury by
holding that the insider trading activity constituted "'the only
truly objective evidence of the materiality of the K-55-1 dis-
covery.' "82 However, the majority's actions were sufficiently
justified through their explanation that the gist of their disagree-
ment with Judge Bonsal on the question of materiality did not
concern his basic findings of fact, but rather the "legal standard"
which should properly be applied to those facts. Hence, the
essence of Judge Moore's criticism really seems to be that the
subjective approach itself was not the correct means to be used in
determining the materiality of the information involved. Such a
8oSee generally judge Moore's dissent from the Second Circuit's
opinion. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff92,251, at 97,195 (2d Cir. Aug. 13,
1968) (dissenting opinion).51 See id. at 97,179, 97,199 (dissenting opinion). An analogy can be
drawn here to Chief judge Leahy's recent interpretation of materiality
in Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Though Escott was concerned with Section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964), which pertains to material misrepresentations
and omissions in registration statements, the opinion is relevant to Teas
Gulf Sulphur in that the language of the statute is quite similar to that
of § 10(b) and also the definition of materiality used was strikingly in point
to that adopted by the Texas Gulf Sulphur court: "[A material fact is one]
which if it had been correctly stated or disclosed would have deterred or
tended to deter the average prudent investor from, purchasing the securities
in question." 283 F. Supp. 643 at 681, citing Matter of Charles A. Howard,
1 S.E.C. 6, 8 (1934). Thus, great emphasis should be placed upon Judge
Leahy's assumption that materiality is a question of fact: "[s]ince no one
knows what moves or does not move the mythical 'average prudent investor,'
it comes down to a question of judgment to be exercised by the trier of
the fact as best he can in the light of all the circumstances." 283 F. Supp.
643 at 682.




construction of his argument appears appropriate in light of his
accusation that the majority confused "the inducing motive of the
individual purchaser with knowledge of material facts which ought
to be revealed to the public at large." 83 Yet, in implicitly advocat-
ing the imposition of a purely objective approach to materiality,
Judge Moore failed to suggest any alternative criterion (other than
actual market changes as a result of the insiders' trading) by
which materiality can adequately be measured.
What Must Be Disclosed
The true significance of the tests which have been formulated
must turn upon the types of information which will be deemed
material under them. It is conceivable that under the court's
broad "reasonable man" standard virtually all information speci-
ficaly concerned with anticipated or current corporate programs or
events potentially constitute a material fact. Although the court
indicated that the duty to disclose would likely arise in situations
'(essentially extraordinary in nature," " it nevertheless emphasized
that
material facts include not only information disclosing the earnings
and distributions of a company but also those facts which affect the
probable future of the company and those which may affect the desire
of investors to buy, sell, or hold the company's securities 8 5
In the past, information of a purely financial nature has posed
few problems and has often been held material8 With respect to
such information, it has been suggested that when considering the
materiality of statements or nondisclosures of corporate earnings,
two factors that should be taken into account are the length of
the period covered and the magnitude of the changes from previous
83 Id.
84 Id. at 97,178, citing Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate In-
formation Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Pro-
ceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1289 (1965).
s5I d. (emphasis added).
s8E.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951)
(tax effects on reported earnings); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F.
Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (nondisclosure related to a dividend reduction);
Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943) (greatly improved
earnings). But cf. Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio and Television Corp., 99
F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir.
1952). However, the decision in the Joseph case apparently rested upon the
private plaintiff's failure to satisfy a "semblance of privity" requirement
which in later cases has been so eroded that a disposition of the case today
would likely produce different results. For the types of information which
have traditionally been held material under lOb-5 see genwrally 3 Loss at
1456-66.
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corresponding, periods.3 7  However, it does not appear that a de
miiimus rule will be adopted with respect to income projections and
other financial predictions, as was indicated by the recent enforce-
ment proceeding brought by the Commission against the Glen
Alden Corporation." While a permanent injunction was entered
against the corporation restraining its insiders from confidentially
disclosing material information in violation of l0b-5, such in-
formation was broadly identified as including "sales, earnings and
cash flow projections . . . for the years 1968 to 1972 . . .and
other material information concerning the affairs of Glen Alden
and its related companies." 89 Apparently, any statement directly
concerned with probable corporate earnings and profits will carry
with it a strong presumption of materiality. Further indication of
the SEC's intention to fully utilize lob-S as a stringent enforcement
tool in this area has been provided by the Commission in its release
detailing the settlement of its claims against the brokerage house
of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.90 Merrill Lynch,
while acting as managing underwriter for Douglas Aircraft Co.,
Inc., in a proposed $75,000,000 debenture offering, received certain
adverse, material non-public information to the effect that Douglas'
reported earnings and earnings estimates for fiscal 1966 would be
sharply reduced (to the extent that little or no profit would be
shown for the year) and that projections for the following year
would also be substantially decreased. This information, revealing
"a significant deterioration in the prospects of Douglas," was dis-
closed by Merrill Lynch to certain of its institutional and other
large customers, several of whom effected sales of more than
190,000 shares of Douglas stock prior to public dissemination of
the information. Relying on Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sul-
phur, the Commission concluded that such selective disclosures
violated lOb-5, in that the information was of "such importance
that it could be expected to affect the judgment of investors to
buy, sell or hold Douglas stock [and that if] generally known, such
information could be expected to affect materially the market price
87 BROMBERG §7.4(2), at 168.1. "A month's operating results, whether
up or down, or the mild weakening of cash position do not seem material.
On the other hand, a major write-off almost certainly is." Id. (footnote
omitted).
88 S.E.C. 1. Glen Alden Corp., CCH Fi. SEC. L. Rm. 192,280
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1968). Note that the proceeding is of limited pre-
cedential value in that it was finally settled on consent by written stipula-
tion between the parties.
89id. at 97,342-43. The defendant corporation had allegedly divulged
such information to certain broker-dealers before it became generally avail-
able to the investing public.9OSee Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., S.E.C. Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8459 (Nov. 25, 1968).
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of the stock." 91 The similarity in language to the Texas Gulf
Sulphur tests is so striking that it must eliminate any doubt as to
the Commission's policy with respect to the materiality of financially
oriented information.
The Texas Gulf Sulphur -opinion clearly evidenced the fact
that non-financial information concerning potential discoveries and
long-range programs can easily become material under l0b-5. In
addition to the Texas Gulf Sulphur type situation, other pending
corporate actions which might be deemed material for "10b-5 pur-
poses would include dividend reduction proposals, lilanned public
or private offerings and acquisition programs, preliminary merger
negotiations and proposed tender offers. The problem in con-
nection with all of these evolving developments, of course, is the
difficulty of determining the exact point at which the activity
develops to the point of materiality. The dividend reduction plan
should cause the least concern, since a board of directors' decision
to cut the expected dividend would obviously result in an adverse
impact on the price of a company's stock . 2  A similar observation
should be made with respect to a proposed stock offering, since
this information is usually crucial in making the initial determina-
tion whether to sell at all. 93  However, it appears that the merger
and acquisition program situations are more problematical, for
each necessarily involves a number of distinct phases, any one of
which might constitute the exact stage at which the transaction
becomes material. 94
One final matter that should be dealt with here, in light of
its relevance to transactions effected on a national exchange,
is whether or not the identity of the buyer or seller must be
revealed under the rule. Here the law is inconsistent: no clear
holding that such disclosures must be made has yet been delivered,9"
and it seems that courts would much rather avoid reaching the
D'Id. at 83,350. Note also that incorporated in the offer of settlement
was a strong Statement of Policy, prohibiting disclosure of material in-
formation by the Underwriting Division, which was again phrased in Texas
Gulf Sudphur terminology. Id. at 83,351.
92 See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911, 915 (1961).
93See Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
0 Professor Bromberg has sought to facilitate the determination here by
devising a hypothetical acquisition program consisting of the following
stages: 1) conception; 2) investigation and analysis; 3) initial valuation;
4) negotiation; 5) the fixing of terms; 6) formal agreement; 7) approval
by shareholders; 8) implementation. BROMBERG §7.4(4)(b), at 173-74. It
would appear that in most instances stage 2 defines the point at which
lOb-5 comes into play.
DrSee geterally BROMBERG §7.4(5), at 175-78; 3 Loss at 1463-65; Note,
supra note 84, at 225-27.
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issue if possible." Two courts which have recently considered the
problem both held that the failure to reveal the buyer's identity
as an insider did not consitute a lOb-5 violation because the in-
formation would have been of little or no concern to the plaintiff
in making his transactional decision (i.e., lack of reliance). 97  In
light of these opinions, it would appear that Professor Loss' some-
what dated statement of the law is still substantially applicable:
In short, all that can be safely said in the present state of the law
is that an insider cannot be certain that failure to disclose his identity
will not be considered a violation of Rule 10b-5, or at the very least
will not be more likely to lead the courts to find a violation when the
non-disclosure of identity is considered in connection with all the
other circumstances.9
Since no black letter law categorically denominating a party's
identity to be material information has yet evolved, courts will
necessarily be guided in this regard by the tests of Texas Gulf
Sulphur. Factors to be considered should include the potential
magnitude of the sale, the kind of transaction involved, and the
relationship of the trader to the issuing corporation. At the very
least, where a true insider is involved, identity would most likely
be a material element, in light of his presumed superior knowledge
with respect to important corporate developments. Similarly, it
would seem that the least importance should be attached to the
identity of the trader in situations where an outside investor, who
ordinarily deals in small quantities of stock, engages in a trans-
action on a large national exchange (where anonymity is often
taken for granted).99
The Problem of Effective Dissemination
A proper determination of the materiality of a known fact
constitutes only the first phase of the insider's duty to disclose.
The insider must also ascertain whether the news in question has
been adequately disseminated before proceeding to trade. As the
Texas Gulf court emphasized, before acting upon material informa-
tion, it "must have been effectively disclosed in a manner sufficient
96See, e.g., Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 242-43
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), wherein the court based its holding on a separate, and
more easily identifiable allegation of 10b-5 fraud (with regard to a proposed
dividend reduction), and thus the court found it unnecessary to rule upon
the question.
97 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965) ; Ross v. Licht,
263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
983 Loss at 1465.
99 See BROMBERG § 7.4(5) (b), at 175-76.
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to insure its availability to the investing public." 1o0 Moreover,
where a formal announcement concerning the particular informa-
tion has been promised to the financial media (as was the case
in Texas Gulf), all insider activity must await such disclosure.
Thus, two TGS officials, one of whom had attempted to "beat the
news" by placing his orders several hours before the company
rendered its official detailed statement to the American financial
press and another who left the press conference shortly before it
was completed to telephone his broker son-in-law and instruct him
to purchase some TGS stock, were both held to violate 10b-5,
through such transactions. While the telephone order had been
placed after the announcement itself had been made, it was pointed
out that the reading of a news release is only the first step in the
required dissemination process; at the very least, trading should
have been restrained until the information "could reasonably have
been expected to appear over the media of widest circulation, the
Dow Jones broad tape." 101
The language of the opinion suggests that the exercise of
restraint until appearance of the news on the broad tape would
constitute the absolute minimum level of compliance. Where the
news was not of a sort easily translatable into investment action
(i.e., information that wouldn't be acted upon instantaneously),
insiders could not exploit their "advanced opportunity" to evaluate
the information by trading at the moment of dissemination. How-
ever, the court neglected to formulate a "reasonable waiting period,"
and merely expressed the hope that the SEC would utilize its rule-
making power to draft regulations with respect to the permissible
timing in insider transactions. 10 2  Perhaps such a rule-making
function, at least on an advisory level, would also fall within the
appropriate jurisdiction of the private exchanges and it seems that
the New York Stock Exchange has already made some progress in
this regard. 0 3
100 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1192,251, at 97,182 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 1968)
(emphasis added). The court noted that an "abbreviated announcement"
issued to the Canadian press by the Minister of Mines, and a report
carried in a Canadian mining review "parts of which had sporadically
reached New York on the morning of the 16th" did not satisfy the "effective
disclosure" standard. Id.
10, Id.
102Id. at 97,182 & n.18. For lob-5 purposes the placing of the order,
not the time of ultimate execution is the determining factor. Otherwise,
insiders could exploit their advance knowledge by placing orders prior to
public announcement with instructions to delay execution until immediately
following the dissemination. Id. at 97,181 & n.17.
103See The New York Stock Exchange Manual § A2, Part III, at A-24
to A-27 (July 18, 1968). The Exchange suggested that corporate officials
should wait until developments have been noted in the press, and further
outlined a series of possible programs which would uniformly regulate
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Conceptually, the task of determining the exact point at
which material information becomes sufficiently public necessarily
presents a number of technical problems respecting the size and
nature of the meeting at which dissemination is to be effectu-
ated, the different organizations which should be represented at
such conferences, the.difficulty of obtaining prompt and reasonable
press coverage, etc.1°4  If the rules of disclosure set forth in
Texas Gulf Sulphur are to be reasonably complied with, solutions
to these problems must be forthcoming. Thus, in order to
attain some degree of "predictability of certainty" for the business
community in this area, uniform regulations should be promulgated
by a competent authority in the very near future.
One final aspect of the disclosure obligation, which must be
mentioned is the fact that, under Texas Gulf Sulphur, an insider's
good faith belief that the information in question has been made
sufficiently public will not constitute a valid defense to either an
SEC enforcement proceeding or a private action. In other words,
negligent insider conduct, not motivated by any specific fraudulent
intent, has become unlawful under rule lOb-5.1°0 The holding
is not as revolutionary as it might seem since recent cases have
substantially indicated that proof of a common-law scienter element
is no longer required in SEC enforcement or regulatory pro-
ceedings,10 6 and a similar trend has been developing with respect
to lOb-5 suits in the private sector.10 7  However, the latter propo-
insider purchases of their own company's stock. However, the policy state-
ment did caution that "[e]ach case must ultimately stand or fall on its
own merits. No single rule could possibly cover all situations; nor should
unnecessary restrictions be permitted to discourage shareowners among
those business leaders who play such a vital role in the success of our
system of free enterprise." Id. at A-27.
104 For example, it is conceivable that a smaller corporation might not
be able to secure space in a financial publication of substantial circulation(e.g., The Wall Street Journal). Are there any viable alternatives?
Would the disclosure requirement be sufficiently satisfied by an announce-
ment at a meeting attended by analysts and representatives of major finan-
cial institutions? It would seem not, unless there is contemporaneous
public disclosure to the press or wire services. Query: should different
"waiting periods" be formulated for tippers and tippees, since the latter
group would be less likely to be informed of the actual moment of release?
What if the tippee is ignorant of the company source of the information?
105 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP,. if92,251, at 97,183 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 1968).
o106See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180
(1963); S.E.C. v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1966) .
107 E.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967); Royal Air
Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). But see 3 Loss at 1442 & n.45. However,
Professor Bromberg has observed that recent cases have seriously eroded
Professor Loss' contention that a scienter element, though less rigorous
than that at common law, is still required under lOb-5 (1), (3), Baommza
§ 2.6(1), at 50 n.135. The Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphulr asserted
that their holding was not inconsistent with previous opinions requiring
 VOL. 43
NOTES
sition has certainly not been universally accepted, and many courts
still require proof of fraudulent intent in private damage actions
even though they may overlook it where the relief sought is es-
sentially equitable or prophylactic.les Nevertheless, the Texas
Gulf Sulphur court rejected arguments put forth by defendants
Clayton, Crawford and Coates that their TGS transactions in
no way violated l0b-5 since they honestly believed that news of
the discovery had been sufficiently publicized by the time their
orders were placed, on the ground that such belief was not
reasonable under the circuinstances.1° 9  Thus, under the Texas
Gulf doctrine, a trading insider's showing of good faith is ap-
parently a useless gesture, and at best will serve only to mitigate
the punishment which the Commission might mete out against
him.1 0
CONCLUSION
In theory, the obligations imposed upon insiders are not
unreasonable; since full disclosure precludes violation, the insider
need only disclose or refrain from trading. Yet, as a practical
matter, insiders will always be in possession of some sort of
value-related information (perhaps as nebulous as the mere
knowledge that the stock traded is actually worth more than
the market value indicates) which may very well constitute
material information under the broad and subjective Texas Gulf
Sulphur tests. Furthermore, disclosure decisions are not normally
within the scope of the individual insider's authority. Rather, the
corporation itself announces important developments, and where
pending business considerations compel secrecy, the insider becomes
subject to a corresponding fiduciary obligation not to reveal the
information in question; hence, trading on his part is an anathema.
Therefore, unless corporations formulate appropriate stock pur-
chase plans to be administered in accordance with the principles
"some form of the traditional scienter requirement" because: "This require-
ment, whether it be termed lack of diligence, constructive fraud, or tin-
reasonable or negligent conduct, remains implicit in this standard [which
encompasses negligence as well as fraud], a standard that promotes the
deterrence objective of the Rule.' CCH FED. Ssc. L. REP. %92,251, at
97,183 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 1968).
°S E.g., Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964);
Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
100 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1192,251, at 97,183 (2d Cir. Aug. 13, 1968).
no See, e.g., Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 917-18 (1961), wherein
the Commission imposed minimal sanctions (a small fine of $3000 and a
short 20 day suspension) upon the defendant broker-dealer in consideration
of his lack of fraudulent intent, the absence of any preconceived plan, and
his good faith belief that the information had been adequately disclosed.
The stock option requirements of Texas Gulf Sulphur will be discussed
in the second part of this article to be published in a subsequent issue.
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espoused in Texas Gulf Sulphur, insiders will in effect forfeit
the right to purchase stock in their own company. Both the
majority in Texas Gulf and the New York Stock Exchange
advocate the adoption of such plans, which contemplate, for
example, periodic investment programs where the timing of the
purchase is without the discretion of the individual officer or
director, or a scheme in which trading commences for a specified
period following the broad distribution of the annual report to
stockholders and other investors. If these or similar programs
are successfully implemented by large corporations, insiders will
be able to maintaiff a meaningful investment interest in the com-
panies they manage without prejudicing the equal access goals
sought by the Second Circuit.
Beyond the "fringe benefit" problems which inner-insiders
will have to overcome, perhaps those individuals who will find
it most difficult to adjust to the Texas Gulf standards are broker-
dealers, security analysts and institutional investors. At the very
least, Texas Gulf Sulphur and Merrill Lynch have made it abso-
lutely clear that these concerns will no longer be allowed to utilize
confidential corporate information in rendering advice to their re-
spective clients; either such information will no longer be accessible
to the brokers and analysts, or, if revealed to them, will have to be
concurrently disseminated to the general investing public. However,
in practical terms, the detrimental effect of the decisions in this area
will be far less significant than one might expect. First of all,
neither analysts nor institutional investors actually thrive on "tips";
rather, their primary function involves the perceptive analysis of
generally available information. Thus, although analysts will be
forced to depend very little upon advanced knowledge of other-
wise undisclosed developments, it seems that their value to ordinary
investors will in no way be diminished; moreover, where informa-
tion is obtained "second hand," and there is no indication that
it derives from an inside source, no added restrictions will be
placed upon its use.
Brokers and dealers may have to effectuate somewhat more
significant adjustments but the problems to be faced are certainly
not insurmountable. Where circumstances place the broker in the
shoes of an insider, he can neither utilize confidential corporate
information for firm accounts nor tip such information to his
partners for their use; consequently, possible conflicts of interest
may arise with regard to those broker-dealers who serve as
directors of large corporations or in similar capacities. How-
ever, the fiduciary relationship existing between a broker and
his client can offer no justification for the commission of an illegal
act, and therefore clients have no right to expect a broker to
bestow upon them the benefits of any inside information he might
possess, at the expense of the general investing public. Further-
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